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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
South Africa’s rights-based refugee legislation has historically allowed refugees and asylum-
seekers to access a broad array of rights from health services to education and employment. 
South Africa has never hosted a dedicated refugee camp or detention centre. Refugees and 
asylum-seekers have found their way into South Africa’s social and economic fabric, sending 
their children to South African schools, finding employment in South African businesses 
and households, and establishing their own formal and informal businesses. The South 
African government has increasingly taken the position that the country’s post-apartheid 
refugee protection legislation is too generous and needs to be revised with greater restric-
tions and fewer rights. This has resulted in major changes to the 1998 Refugees Act in the 
2016 Refugees Amendment Act, and the indication of a new restrictive approach to refu-
gee protection in the 2017 White Paper on International Migration in South Africa. Both 
developments seek to bring South Africa in line with the exclusionary policies towards 
asylum-seekers and refugees seen in many other countries globally. These developments, 
several years in the making, represent a profound reconfiguration of the country’s approach 
to refugee rights, protections, and associated international obligations; moving away from 
an integration approach towards a containment and repulsion approach. This is part of a 
more global state-led trend, which seeks to inhibit access to the physical territory and refu-
gee protection systems through erecting physical, economic and social barriers to entry. 
In the absence of material support from the South African government or the UNHCR, 
one of the primary livelihood strategies of asylum-seekers and refugees in the country has 
been to create work for themselves in the informal sector. The policy environment in which 
refugee entrepreneurs run informal businesses on the streets and in residential areas is not 
governed by refugee legislation but by national, provincial and local policies towards the 
informal sector. Those working in the informal sector face an ambiguous policy environ-
ment that has occasionally supported but largely ignored, and at times actively destroyed, 
informal sector livelihoods and those of migrant and refugee businesses in particular. To 
fully understand the policy environment within which migrants and refugees establish and 
operate their enterprises in the South African informal sector, this report brings together 
two streams of policy analysis. The first concerns South Africa’s changing refugee policies 
and practices and the erosion of the protective and progressive refugee policy approach 
that characterized the immediate post-apartheid period. The second concerns the highly 
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ambiguous post-apartheid informal sector policy, which oscillates between tolerance and 
attempted destruction at national and municipal levels. While there have been longstand-
ing tensions between foreign and South African informal sector operators, an overtly anti-
foreign migrant sentiment has increasingly been expressed in official policy and practice. 
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INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen South Africa’s apparently generous asylum and refugee system 
flounder, characterized by ever-growing wait times for status decisions, increased bar-
riers for application and renewal of permits, and growing disregard for refugee law and 
court orders.1 The South African government has increasingly taken the position that the 
country’s post-apartheid refugee protection legislation is far too generous and needs to be 
revised in the direction of greater restrictions and fewer rights. This has resulted in major 
changes to the 1998 Refugees Act in the 2016 Refugees Amendment Act, and the indica-
tion of a new restrictive approach to refugee protection in the 2017 White Paper on Inter-
national Migration in South Africa.2 Both developments seek to bring South Africa in line 
with the exclusionary policies towards asylum-seekers and refugees seen in many other 
countries globally.3 In the absence of material support from the South African government 
or the UNHCR, one of the primary livelihood strategies of asylum-seekers and refugees 
in the country has been to create work for themselves in the informal sector. The policy 
environment in which refugee entrepreneurs run informal businesses on the streets and in 
residential areas is not governed by refugee legislation but by national, provincial and local 
policies towards the informal sector. Those working in the informal sector face an ambigu-
ous policy environment that has occasionally supported but largely ignored, and at times 
actively destroyed, informal sector livelihoods and those of migrant and refugee businesses 
in particular. 
To fully understand the policy environment within which migrants and refugees estab-
lish and operate their enterprises in the South African informal sector, we need to bring 
together two streams of policy analysis. The first concerns South Africa’s changing refu-
gee policies and practices and the erosion of the protective and progressive refugee policy 
approach that characterized the immediate post-apartheid period.4 The second concerns 
the highly ambiguous post-apartheid informal sector policy, which oscillates between tol-
erance and attempted destruction at national and municipal levels. While there have been 
longstanding tensions between foreign and South African informal sector operators, an 
overtly anti-foreign migrant sentiment has increasingly been expressed in official policy 
and practice. 
This report underlines the need for both a rights-based asylum system and more pro-
gressive policies towards the informal sector. Refugee entrepreneurs and service providers 
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agree that obtaining refugee status is key to enabling refugee entrepreneurship and sustain-
able livelihoods. While this status should mark a signpost to successful local integration, 
the South African government continues to pile on administrative and logistical barriers to 
the asylum process and prospective refugees. These measures add to the ambiguity around 
migration management in the country and complicate the prospects for refugees to provide 
for themselves in a safe and sustainable manner. 
The report is based on a review of media and official government sources, published and 
grey literature, and interviews with key informants in the city of Cape Town and the prov-
inces of Limpopo and Gauteng during 2015. A total of 30 in-depth interviews were con-
ducted including with researchers, refugee and diaspora associations, refugee rights NGOs, 
law enforcement, the City of Cape Town and Western Cape governments, and international 
organizations such as the IOM and UNHCR. Interviews were also conducted with national 
government departments including Home Affairs, Labour, and Small Business Develop-
ment. 
REFUGEE POLICY AND PRACTICE 
South Africa is a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refu-
gees and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa. Since the end of apartheid, it has built a reputation as a protective and progres-
sive refugee-receiving country. South Africa’s 1998 Refugees Act integrated international 
refugee protections into domestic law and exceeded international standards in important 
respects. The Act made generous allowances for freedom of movement, access to health 
and education services, some social protection, and the right to work. Most notably, it Act 
embraced local integration over encampment, which was a progressive choice in Africa 
at the time.5 Underpinning the Act was a political and ideological approach which pos-
ited that refugees were permitted and fully expected to integrate temporarily into the host 
country and benefit from all attendant protections and rights granted to citizens by the 
Constitution. Refugees who had been in the country for five years were entitled to apply 
for permanent residence. In exchange for these progressive policies, both government and 
the UNHCR incurred minimal costs in providing material support for asylum-seekers and 
refugees in the country. 
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In the years since these somewhat idealistic beginnings, South Africa has seen a distinct 
deterioration in the rights-based approach to refugee protection.6 International praise for 
South Africa’s liberal approach has been eroded by chronic processing delays, poor and ill-
informed adjudication, and the corruption and mismanagement that has become endemic 
to the asylum process. South Africa has one of the longest asylum adjudication periods 
in the world, with some cases stretching out for many years. After 2007, the economic 
meltdown in Zimbabwe imposed significant pressure on the asylum system as migrants 
from Zimbabwe moved in large numbers to South Africa.7 South Africa’s failure to antici-
pate and account for the entry of Zimbabweans created a situation whereby the asylum 
system became contorted into something of a “catch all” for generalized migration into 
South Africa.8 While Zimbabwean migrants have subsequently been criticized by the South 
African government for “abusing” and overloading the asylum process, they had no other 
options for legal stay in South Africa. They were in fact encouraged to use the system by the 
establishment of a Refugee Reception Office in Musina by the Department of Home Affairs 
(DHA), specifically to speed up the issue of asylum-seeker permits to Zimbabweans.
Those close to the process argue that the demand for a place in South Africa’s asylum 
queue, with its attendant right to work, rendered the system ineffectual in conducting 
legitimate refugee adjudication. This translated into increasingly strident denunciations 
of “bogus” claimants and “abuse of the system” by economic migrants. As the Minister 
of Home Affairs observed in a speech on World Refugee Day in 2016: “An unintended 
consequence of our liberal asylum regime has been that migrants who are not genuine 
refugees but are seeking economic opportunities have used it to attempt to regularise their 
stay in South Africa. The sheer volume of applications from these migrants has placed an 
enormous burden on the refugee status determination process, which has disadvantaged 
genuine asylum seekers by delaying their decisions, in the past taking years where they 
should take no more than 6 months”.9 The official line is that 90% of asylum-seekers are 
economic migrants, although there is no evidential basis for this claim (other than the fact 
that only about 10% of asylum-seekers to date have been granted refugee status).10 How-
ever, this conclusion is a non-sequitur, given the arbitrariness of many decisions and the 
practice of adjudicating claims by country or origin and not the personal experience of the 
individual claimant.11 The fact that the rejection rate is also a function of a system that is 
under-resourced, staffed by small numbers of poorly trained officers and rife with corrup-
tion, is unacknowledged.
rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy
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The reasons for this shift from rights and protections towards exclusion and control 
are seen by some as the inevitable consequence of life in a country where the majority still 
struggle to meet basic needs and there is competition for scarce public resources such as 
education, health care, and shelter, as well as employment and other livelihood opportuni-
ties.12 In this zero sum game, every advantage that a refugee or asylum-seeker enjoys nec-
essarily disadvantages a South African. However, at least one recent study has argued that 
South Africans do not oppose refugee protection for reasons of economic self-interest.13 
Rather their opposition is further evidence of the xenophobic character of South African 
society, with the attendant failure to acknowledge the positive economic, social and cultural 
contribution that refugees and asylum-seekers make to the country.14 As the study con-
cludes, “public animosity towards refugees in South Africa has motivated anti-immigrant 
riots, violence, and prejudice which has negatively impacted on refugee protection.”15 As a 
result, “a protection strategy dedicated to maximizing refugees’ freedom and integration 
may prove politically untenable in an era of pronounced anti-immigrant hostilities.”16 
Government argues that the breakdown of the refugee protection system in South 
Africa, and the need for reform, is because it has been overwhelmed by economic migrants. 
For a period, the DHA argued that there were a million asylum-seekers in the country, a 
figure that was uncritically reproduced by the UNHCR and the media and translated into 
bogus claims that South Africa was the leading global destination for refugees. The White 
Paper on International Migration admits that this figure is erroneous, noting that in 2015, 
only 78,339 asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits were still active.17 This revised figure is a 
considerable climb-down by the DHA and hardly justifies the image it promulgated of a 
system swamped.18 Nor does it justify the draconian amendments to the law in process. 
Rather than being motivated by a need to address an overburdened system, therefore, the 
narrowing of refugee rights and imposition of additional limitations on the ability of refu-
gees to find safety and security in South Africa are better interpreted as an effort to make 
the country an undesirable destination for asylum-seekers and refugees. Several inter-con-
nected strategies have been developed to achieve this end. All are embodied in the 2016 
Refugees Amendment Act (which was passed Parliament in March 2017 and awaits Cabi-
net approval before becoming law) and the 2017 White Paper on International Migration.
The first strategy has been to shift from an integrationist towards a detention model. 
The White Paper on International Migration reaffirms plans that are already under way to 
establish what it calls Asylum-Seeker Processing Centres away from urban areas.19 These 
are widely seen by critics as a euphemism for encampment despite government denials. 
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Plans have been drawn up for the location and physical infrastructure of detention cen-
tres close to South Africa’s borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique and construction has 
apparently begun on a detention centre at Lebombo.20 The White Paper notes that these 
detention centres are intended to accommodate all asylum-seekers during their status 
determination process.21 Freedom of movement and integration into local communities 
(as at present) would be halted. So-called “low risk” asylum-seekers might be released into 
the care of national or international organizations and family or community members who 
would have to provide guarantees of support that excluded employment. Asylum-seekers 
would be deprived of the court-mandated right they have at present to work or study “since 
their basic needs will be catered for in the processing centres.”22 To pre-empt the inevi-
table, and justifiable, criticism that South Africa is introducing a policy of encampment, 
the earlier Green Paper awkwardly asserted that “these centres should not be considered 
as contrary to the policy of non-encampment but as centres for mitigating security risks 
posed by irregular migration” (DHA, 2016: 66). The claim that this somehow represents a 
continuation of the country’s non-encampment policy is disingenuous. Under this policy, 
asylum-seekers will be sequestered in detention centres for the duration of the adjudication 
process, which is unrealistically envisioned as a 60 to 90-day process. Whether that process 
takes place within the proposed period or not, asylum-seekers would be fully dependent 
on government or international organizations for food, shelter, health care, education and 
other basic needs. The cost of constructing and maintaining detention centres for large 
numbers of asylum-seekers will be massive and UNHCR has indicated that it will not 
underwrite detention costs despite appeals from the South African government (which 
previously constrained the UNHCR from offering material assistance to asylum-seekers). 
If South Africa faced an influx of asylum-seekers in the future akin to the over 200,000 
Zimbabweans between 2006 and 2009, it is difficult to see how these centres would cope. 
The second major strategy to turn the country into an undesirable destination for refu-
gees is to put in place procedural, administrative and logistical hurdles that complicate an 
already tenuous status and sustainability. The most obvious example is the Department of 
Home Affairs halving the number of Refugee Reception Offices (RROs) in the country by 
closing busy offices in Johannesburg (Crown Mines), Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. Only 
three RROs remain open: in Musina, Durban and Pretoria. The closure was “not merely a 
technical, operational decision, but one which impacts on the basic principles of the asylum 
system, namely access (for initial applications, renewals, status determination interviews 
and appeals) and administrative efficiency and fairness.”23 Legal challenges to the closures 
rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy
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have produced contradictory outcomes. The Supreme Court of Appeal ordered the re-
opening of the Port Elizabeth RRO, a judgment that the DHA has been slow to implement. 
In contrast, the Cape Town High Court decided that the Cape Town RRO could remain 
closed. Because of the controversy, the 2016 Refugees Amendment Act gives the Direc-
tor General of Home Affairs new powers to “dis-establish” any RRO and to force a whole 
category of asylum-seeker (defined in terms of country of origin or “a particular gender, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or social group”) to report at designated RROs. 
The associated administrative requirement that asylum-seekers must renew their per-
mits every one to six months at the RRO where they obtained their permit (rather than an 
ordinary Home Affairs Office) imposes considerable financial and other hardships. The 
renewal period appears to be arbitrary and, according to some refugees, depends on the 
size of the bribe that they are willing to pay. Individuals and families who have found safety, 
shelter, work or school in another part of the country are forced to travel to the RRO to 
ensure that their status remains intact. Furthermore, wait times for receiving or renewing a 
permit are considerable. The scene outside the Marabastad (Pretoria) RRO was described 
by one key informant as follows:
They come to Pretoria, there are queues and queues, never-ending queues. And 
then each country has a day. So now you have come to the Home Affairs office 
and it’s not your turn, your turn only comes after 4 days. And then you are told 
that if you have ZAR2,000, these officials walk around and if you have money, 
you give them the money and go to the front of the queue. If you don’t have 
money, then you are right at the back. And then you have to come back the 
following week on the day of your country.
In a situation where asylum-seekers are almost exclusively self-supporting, without the 
assistance of government or the international community, they are forced to sacrifice valu-
able time and money, risk jeopardizing their jobs, and have to travel with or leave young 
children behind. Under the 2016 Act, failure to renew an asylum-seeker permit within 
one month of expiry will lead to automatic revocation of status, forfeiture of the right to 
renewal, and treatment as an “illegal foreigner” in terms of the Immigration Act (that is, 
summary arrest and deportation). Asylum-seekers whose claims are refused are also to be 
treated as “illegal foreigners”. An asylum-seeker with an expired permit will also be guilty 
of an offence and liable to a fine and imprisonment of up to five years or both. Any indi-
vidual or group of asylum-seekers or refugees can be arrested and deported on the vaguely-
worded grounds of “national interest or public order.” 
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The third strategy to undermine the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees and to make 
South Africa an undesirable place of refuge, is to undercut court judgments affirming the 
right of asylum-seekers and refugees to employment and self-employment. The 2016 Act 
explicitly seeks to overturn a judgment that permitted asylum-seekers to work in South 
Africa while awaiting adjudication of their claims. The onus will now be on “family and 
friends” to support asylum-seekers for their first four months in the country. If such support 
is not available, the UNHCR and NGOs are permitted to provide “shelter and basic neces-
sities.” In both situations, the asylum-seeker is prohibited from working, while government 
assumes no responsibility for their care and protection. The government-appointed Stand-
ing Committee on Refugee Affairs is also empowered to decide unilaterally under what 
conditions asylum-seekers may work or study. If they are permitted to work or study, they 
are required to provide a letter from the employer or institution within 14 days from the 
date of employment or enrolment. The employer or institution can be fined ZAR20,000 if 
they fail to provide the documentation in the prescribed period. The right to work can also 
be revoked by the Director General. The Act says nothing about the right to access informal 
work and self-employment, which was a key component of earlier court judgments. 
The fourth strategy in rendering South Africa undesirable is to ensure that protection 
is always temporary by making it extremely difficult for refugees to progress to permanent 
residence and eventual citizenship. The 1998 Act stated that refugees were entitled to apply 
for permanent residence after five years’ continuous residence in South Africa and refugees 
“of good and sound character” could be issued with permanent residence permits irrespec-
tive of the length of sojourn in the country. This is one reason why the maximum length of a 
refugee (Section 24) permit was four years. The 2016 Act gives the Minister of Home Affairs 
new powers to issue an order that ceases recognition of an individual refugee or group of 
refugees or to revoke refugee status without the obligation to provide justification for such 
an action. The right of a refugee to apply for permanent residence has also been extended 
from five to 10 years. The White Paper proposes to do away with the category of permanent 
residence altogether and replace it with a long-term, renewable residence visa, for which 
refugees would become eligible after 10 years. It also seeks to sever any connection between 
length of residence and citizenship eligibility.24
The recent case of long-term Angolan refugees in South Africa provides an instructive 
example of the official thinking underlying the current drive to choke the refugee path to 
permanent residence. In 2013, the Department of Home Affairs stripped all refugees from 
rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy
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Angola of their refugee status irrespective of length of residence and then, under protest, 
issued them with two-year non-renewable temporary residence permits (called Angolan 
Cessation Permits or ACPs).25 In 2016, after extensive negotiations between human rights 
advocates and the DHA, the department finally agreed that former Angolan refugees could 
apply for permanent residence. The Western Cape High Court then issued an order by 
which all former Angolan refugees with expired ACPs could apply for permanent resi-
dence. In February 2017, the Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town submitted 1,757 applications 
on behalf of Angolan refugees to the DHA. The successful court action not only prevents 
the summary deportation of former Angolan refugees but could potentially provide an 
important precedent for future cases of cessation. The White Paper attempts to ensure that 
this will never happen. 
Finally, prior to 2010, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) prohibited refugees 
and asylum-seekers from opening bank accounts in South Africa. That policy was later 
relaxed but FICA’s anti-money-laundering provisions still require banks to verify the iden-
tity of persons wanting to open a bank account. Banks are given wide discretion as to how 
they implement the requirements, with the result that many refuse to open accounts for 
refugees and asylum-seekers. In response to legal action, the DHA and FICA agreed that 
the department would provide banks with the means to verify the authenticity of refugee 
and asylum permits. In practice, opening a bank account remains a challenge for refugees 
and asylum-seekers, with banks remaining distrustful of DHA documentation. There have 
also been instances of refugees and asylum-seekers having their assets frozen when identity 
documents have not been renewed on time, when identity documents change, or when 
the DHA has failed to respond to verification enquiries in a timely manner. A frozen bank 
account raises grave protection concerns, threatening the ability to pay rent, buy food, care 
for children, and even cover costs for long-distance travel for the purposes of renewing 
status documentation.26 Because of these difficulties, refugees and asylum-seekers tend to 
carry large amounts of cash, making them ready targets for theft. Refugees and asylum-
seekers also find it extremely difficult to obtain bank loans to start a business or for ongo-
ing operations. Only 1% had managed to secure a bank loan to start a business in a recent 
SAMP survey of over 1,000 refugee-owned informal businesses. The refusal rate was 75%-
80%. While it would be incorrect to suggest that banks are colluding in the project to make 
South Africa an undesirable destination, their actions certainly have that effect. 
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INFORMAL SECTOR POLICY AND PRACTICE
Most asylum-seekers and refugees have little choice but to work in the informal sector 
in South Africa. If the proposals to prohibit asylum-seekers from working legally become 
law, this will have a major impact on the sector. A 2015 SAMP survey of 1,132 informal 
businesses run by migrants in Cape Town and Johannesburg found that 18% were refu-
gee (Section 24) permit holders and 30% were asylum-seeker (Section 22) permit hold-
ers.27 Depriving asylum-seekers (present and future) of the right to self-employment in the 
informal sector will undoubtedly lead to further court challenges but the intent is clearly to 
reduce the number of asylum-seekers coming to South Africa and the number of foreign-
owned enterprises in the sector. This would be consistent with the general aim of rendering 
South Africa an undesirable destination, but would also further national and local informal 
sector policy. These policies are increasingly focused on demonizing non-South Africans 
and forcing them off the streets and out of the low-income communities where they play a 
central role in making food and other consumables accessible to the urban poor. 
Under apartheid, black South Africans were forbidden from engaging in informal 
businesses and access to business premises was strictly regulated. Influx control laws 
became increasingly unenforceable in the mid-1980s and were abolished in 1986. In 1987, 
the National White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation introduced a more tolerant 
approach to black small business as part of a broader new economic philosophy informed 
by the Reagan-Thatcher era of deregulation. The change of attitude culminated in the Busi-
nesses Act 71 of 1991 (which repealed numerous restrictive laws and secured a more liberal 
approach to business licencing, premises and hours for both formal and informal business). 
This legislation was a key measure for removing barriers to the operation of informal activi-
ties and was, in effect, a complete reversal of the apartheid approach. 
After the passage of the 1991 Act, informal-sector activities increased in all cities and 
towns. Local authorities, however, complained that they were unable to cope, particularly 
with the growth of informal trading in public spaces. This led to the Businesses Amend-
ment Act 186 of 1993 which gave provinces the discretion to develop their own legislation 
and allowed local authorities to formulate street-trading bylaws, and declare restricted and 
prohibited trade zones. Since then, local authorities across the country have promulgated 
such bylaws in near mirror images of one another. In all major metropoles, the sanctions 
for violation were inappropriately criminalized – either a fine or imprisonment – indicating 
a punitive approach to informal sector management. 
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At a national level, the 1995 White Paper on the Development and Promotion of Small 
Businesses was one of the first economic policy initiatives of the post-apartheid govern-
ment. The White Paper and the legislation that stemmed from it – the 1996 National Small 
Business Act – acknowledged survivalist and micro-enterprises as components of small 
business, thus making them, on paper, beneficiaries of government support. Both docu-
ments were, however, silent on the specific needs of these smaller players, suggesting that 
the role played by this group was not seen as a critical issue. Neither referred to foreign 
migrants or refugees, possibly because their presence in the small business sector was fairly 
small at the time. To implement the new approach, the Department of Trade and Indus-
try (DTI) set up the Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency as a facilitation and promotion 
body for small businesses and Khula Finance to secure small-business access to financial 
services. It also supported the establishment of a countrywide network of Local Business 
Development Centres to provide non-financial support to small, medium and micro enter-
prises (SMMEs). 
In 2004, a comprehensive review of the impact of the post-apartheid SMME programmes 
concluded that “existing government SMME programmes largely have been biased towards 
the groups of small and medium-sized enterprises and to a large extent have by-passed 
micro-enterprises and the informal economy.”28 An evaluation of the government’s skills 
development system concluded similarly that those working in the informal sector had 
“fallen into the gap” between small businesses and the unemployed.29 These findings were 
echoed in an informal-sector budget analysis and confirmed by survey data conducted with 
informal-sector operators in Johannesburg and Durban.30 
In 2003, President Mbeki publicly advocated for the idea of the “second economy” in 
an address to the National Council of Provinces. Mbeki’s negative view of the second econ-
omy saw it as characterized by “underdevelopment, contributes little to GDP, contains a 
large percentage of our population, incorporates the poorest of our rural and urban poor, 
is structurally disconnected from both the first and the global economy, and is incapable 
of self-generated growth and development.”31 According to Mbeki, the second economy 
required “the infusion of capital and other resources by the democratic state to ensure the 
integration of this economy within the developed sector.” Although the concept of a second 
economy was not novel, its application to South Africa was an important moment in raising 
the public policy profile of the informal sector. The whole idea of a second economy elicited 
a flurry of criticism, however.32 According to one critic, second-economy arguments were 
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based on the premise that “the mainstream of the economy is working rather well, and gov-
ernment action is needed to enhance the linkages between the first and second economy 
and where appropriate to provide relief, such as public works programmes, to those locked 
into the informal economy.”33 
Subsequent policy pronouncements argued that the second economy should be eradi-
cated altogether. The 2006 Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa, for exam-
ple, called for the “elimination” of the second economy.34 In 2008, the Presidency initiated 
the Second Economy Strategy Project, which proposed the progressive incorporation of 
the second into the first economy. The project’s strategic framework and strategies were 
approved by Cabinet but the recall of Mbeki as President led to a loss of momentum. While 
a proposed community works programme was implemented, the remaining strategies were 
not translated into activities at national, provincial and local levels. 
Since 2012, increasing attention has been paid to the informal sector at national level 
– albeit in a somewhat haphazard and uncoordinated fashion. Different initiatives repre-
sent simultaneous neglect, support and suppression. The 2012 National Development Plan 
(NDP), for example, assigns a large role to small businesses in its employment scenarios 
and plans.35 The NDP’s ideal scenario projects that 11 million jobs will be created by 2030, 
suggesting that 90% of these new jobs will be created by small and growing enterprises. Of 
these, the informal sector (and domestic work) will create between 1.2 million and 2.1 mil-
lion new jobs.36 However, the NDP chapter on the economy says nothing about strategies 
for the informal sector per se, how existing operators in the informal sector will be sup-
ported, and how barriers to entry will be addressed to help generate new jobs. 
Also in 2012, the DTI established a new directorate for Informal Business and Chamber 
Support. This constituted a recognition by the DTI of the role of the informal sector in 
broadening economic participation.37 By the end of the year, the directorate had established 
a reference group charged with developing a National Informal Business Development 
Strategic Framework. Under the guidance of the reference group, DTI staff conducted con-
sultations with stakeholders in the informal sector, formal business, and local government 
officials over a few months, and reported back to the reference group in February 2013. This 
led to the launch of the National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS) in 2014.38 
In the same period, and apparently unbeknown to the reference group, another section of 
the DTI was working under the Minister’s direction on new legislation to replace the Busi-
nesses Amendment Act of 1993. 
rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy
14
In March 2013, the DTI released a draft Business Licensing Bill.39 The Bill’s stated aim 
was “to provide for a simple and enabling framework for procedures for application of 
business licences by setting norms and standards.”40 The DTI Minister, Rob Davies, later 
claimed that the Bill was put in place to deal with illegal trading practices, citing illegal 
imports, sub-standard goods, counterfeit goods, and illegal drug and liquor trading. In fact, 
as critics pointed out, these were already adequately dealt with through other laws such as 
the Customs and Excise Act of 1964, the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics, and Disinfectants Act of 
1972, Counterfeit Goods Act of 1997, Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act of 1992 and a raft 
of provincial level legislation aimed at regulating (through the issuing of licences) informal 
liquor outlets or shebeens.41 
Where the NIBUS and the draft Business Licensing Bill converge is their common atti-
tude towards migrants and refugees running small businesses in the informal economy. 
Essentially, both attempt to regulate, control and exclude participation by non-South Afri-
cans. The NIBUS is characterized by implicit and explicit anti-migrant sentiment. It states 
that foreign-owned informal businesses are an “express challenge” since there is “no regu-
latory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners (sic)” and “no synergy between 
the DTI and Home Affairs in devising strategies and policies to control foreign business 
activities.”42 It identifies a supposed “foreign trader challenge” in the informal sector, not-
ing that “there is evidence of violence and unhappiness of local communities with regard 
to the takeover of local business by foreign nationals” [our emphasis].43 There are numer-
ous complementary suggestions to strengthen South African informal sector businesses. 
To reduce the “xenophobia associated with foreign national traders,” the NIBUS proposes 
to “influence the type of businesses that foreign nationals should run and the demarcated 
areas where these businesses should be active.”44 As precedent for an exclusionary policy, 
NIBUS cites the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, which has reserved selling at 
markets, petty trading and hawking, and the operation of metered taxis, car hire services, 
beauty salons and barber shops to nationals only, as well as India and Malaysia’s restrictions 
on foreign economic participation.45 The Department of Home Affairs is also criticized 
for supposedly having “no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners.”46 
One assessment concluded that “NIBUS is a pro-development approach for South African 
informal entrepreneurs which is allied to an anti-developmental agenda towards migrant 
entrepreneurs.”47 In 2013, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry sharply criticized 
South Africans for renting their properties to migrants, saying that “the scourge of South 
migration policy series no. 79
15
Africans in townships selling and renting their businesses to foreigners unfortunately does 
not assist us as government in our efforts to support and grow these informal businesses.”48 
Turning to the draft Business Licensing Bill, the legislation would require anyone 
involved in business activities – no matter how small – to have a licence with fines or 
imprisonment for up to 10 years for those in contravention. Foreign migrants would only 
be licensed if they had business permits, which, according to the 2002 Immigration Act, 
have to be applied for in the country of origin and are only granted if the applicant can 
demonstrate having ZAR2.5 million to invest in South Africa. The Bill suggested that wide-
ranging discretionary powers be given to both the licensing authority and inspectors, far 
greater than those granted by the 1993 Business Amendment Act. The eventual withdrawal 
of the Bill from Parliament was prompted not by concerns about its draconian approach 
to migrants and refugees in the sector, but because of a chorus of opposition from private 
business and non-governmental organizations pointing out that the result would be large-
scale criminalizing of the informal sector as a whole. A submission from StreetNet Interna-
tional, on behalf of South African street trader organizations from all nine provinces, was 
particularly critical: “What the [1991] Businesses Act added to the new South Africa was a 
developmental approach…instead of the old abolitionist approach which characterised the 
Apartheid era. We believe that the repeal of the Businesses Act and replacement with this 
Bill…would take us back to the era of forced removals.”49 
The impossible conditions imposed on migrants and refugees for accessing a licence 
would have meant that few migrant informal operators would qualify and most would 
therefore be criminalized. Indeed, it has been argued that the Bill was introduced to regu-
late foreign migrants out of the sector in the interests of their South African counterparts.50 
To understand the anti-migrant content of the NIBUS and Draft Bill, it is important to 
appreciate the upsurge of animosity towards refugees and asylum-seekers among South 
African-owned businesses.51 Both can be seen as a policy response to the complaints of 
these operators and the pressure on government to act. They can also be seen as a response 
to the phenomenon of “violent entrepreneurship”; that is, South Africans taking the law 
into their own hands and organizing attacks on refugee businesses. Instead of offering and 
providing protection to those at risk, the DTI reached the conclusion that it would be bet-
ter to adopt the xenophobic rhetoric of the streets, cast refugees and asylum-seekers as a 
threat, and implement policies to try to get them out of the informal sector. These attitudes 
and responses to refugees and asylum-seekers in the informal sector were certainly not 
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confined to the DTI and DHA, and became particularly apparent in the response to a wave 
of violent xenophobic attacks in early 2015. 
The major government response to the 2015 violence was the establishment of an Inter-
Ministerial Committee on Migration (IMC) housed in the Presidency, on which 15 govern-
ment ministers sat. The IMC concluded that the primary cause of the violence against for-
eign nationals was “increased competition arising from the socio-economic circumstances 
in South Africa.”52 The total number of migrants in the country was grossly exaggerated 
at between five million and six million. It was thus “highly likely” that immigrants repre-
sented more than 10% of the country’s population. Foreign nationals were supposedly plac-
ing a strain on government services such as health, housing, education and social grants 
and “dominating trade in certain sectors such as consumable goods in informal settlements 
which has had a negative impact on unemployed and low skilled South Africans.” The IMC 
also referred to the “business models used by migrants to discourage competition such 
as forming monopolies, evading taxes, avoiding customs and selling illegal and expired 
goods.”53
In April 2015, the IMC launched the nationwide Operation Fiela. Billed as a crime-
fighting initiative, a central component of the operation was a massive drive to harass 
migrant-owned businesses, locate undocumented migrants and facilitate their deportation. 
In Cape Town, for example, just before the global celebration of World Refugee Day, the 
police, army, traffic officials, and immigration officials descended on Cape Town’s station 
deck (a taxi terminus and market above Cape Town’s main railway station) and systemati-
cally harassed foreign-owned businesses:
It was really terrifying the manner in which they did [things] yesterday. Soldiers 
pointed guns, ready to shoot anyone [who was] against what was happening. I 
was selling some brand stuff, but these people went beyond that. Some of them 
were wicked. I could neither question their authority nor do anything to stop 
them from taking my stuff. They came in and took down all my stuff. They 
confiscated almost 50 items [including] jeans, trousers and tops. Out of these 
items, less than ten were brand names. Yesterday was a great loss, since the 
operation went into our busiest time of the day, between 10 and 11am…The 
unfortunate thing is they did not give us a receipt to show what they have 
confiscated…I believe in a normal situation they issue a receipt…We did not 
get any chance to talk to them regarding how we could go about [getting back] 
the goods seized.54 
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By the end of 2015, government boasted that Operation Fiela had searched 460,000 
people, 151,000 vehicles and 38,000 premises. The absence of due process in the militaristic 
implementation of Operation Fiela led Lawyers for Human Rights to (unsuccessfully) chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the operation in the North Gauteng High Court. An applica-
tion for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court was dismissed in December 2016. A 
representative for Lawyers for Human Rights described Operation Fiela as follows:
What we found astonishing was the Operation Fiela response from government. 
They said the appropriate response (to xenophobia) is multi-agency enforcement 
to identify and address and detain and deport undocumented migrants and 
the justification was that South Africans are concerned about large numbers 
of undocumented migrants and involvement in crime and threats to social 
cohesion. So the best way to address the issue was to remove them. It emphasised 
the growing securitisation of migration – the language they used was national 
security language and moved away from rights language. 
With regard, specifically, to the violence against foreign-owned businesses, government 
has been extremely responsive to arguments that these businesses are providing “unfair” 
competition and putting South Africans out of business. Whether this is true or not has 
never been ascertained and research evidence about the positive economic impacts of 
migrant and refugee business activity is strategically ignored. 
In 2014, a Department of Small Business Development was hived off from the DTI to 
identify a strategy to manage the informal sector and encourage SMME development. The 
new Minister initially acknowledged the right of international migrants to operate when 
she stated that “they must make a living. The more they make a living, the more they con-
tribute to the economy. They pay taxes and are active participants in the economy.”55 This 
quickly changed to an emphasis on the negative impacts on South Africans of “foreign-
ers.” By 2015, for example, she was castigating “foreign business owners” for expecting to 
co-exist peacefully with local business owners while not sharing their “trade secrets.” She 
remarked that “foreigners” cannot “barricade themselves in and not share their practices 
with local business owners.”56 The adviser to the Minister speaks openly of the “invasion” 
of “foreign traders” as an “ongoing sore point.”57 Further, “foreigners have taken over these 
markets and even control sectors, such as hair dressing and value chains. Thus, the inter-
mittent explosions against foreigners will continue despite efforts by the government to 
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pacify the situation. Nobody wants this violence but, let us be frank with each other, locals 
are not merely going to sit in the corner and sulk.”58
Recasting refugees and asylum-seekers as “foreigners” is key to this exclusionary dis-
course. At provincial government level, the national-level antagonism towards refugees 
and migrants in the informal sector has been repeated. While the 1993 amendment to the 
Businesses Act empowered provinces to develop dedicated provincial business acts, to date 
no province has done that. In KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), an informal economy policy process 
was initiated in 2003. This resulted, after eight years, in the KZN Informal Economy Policy 
of 2011, but it has not yet been developed into a White Paper.59 In other provinces, refer-
ence is made to the informal sector in local economic development strategies (as in Lim-
popo) as well as township development strategies. The Western Cape promulgated its first 
dedicated Informal Sector Framework in 2014 and Gauteng recently released the Gauteng 
Informal Business Development Strategy.60 Both focus on aligning with the NIBUS. All 
of the documents echo the need for financial and non-financial support to informal busi-
nesses (especially through small-business development centres), supporting informal trad-
ing in townships, improved access to business-related infrastructure facilities, and review-
ing regulations and bylaws to support the informal business sector. However, there is a clear 
anti-foreign sentiment in the Gauteng strategy:
The existing competition for trading permits among local and foreign nationals 
is evident. Unfortunately, there are no regulatory restrictions in controlling the 
influx of foreign nationals. The Departments of Trade and Industry and Home 
Affairs should assist the province in devising strategies and policies to control 
foreign business activities.61 
Similar sentiments are expressed in the Western Cape document (Western Cape Prov-
ince, 2014: 46). In KwaZulu-Natal, the provincial government formed and funded the KZN 
Provincial Association of Traders and traders’ training academies. The purpose of this ini-
tiative is to “bring back our general dealer stores that used to be seen in our townships and 
villages (which) have been sold to foreign nationals.”62 
The provincial government in Limpopo Province has perhaps taken the most overtly 
hostile approach to migrants and refugees working in the informal sector. In 2012, it 
launched Operation Hardstick, an aggressive military-style campaign that targeted small 
informal businesses run by migrants and refugees. The Somali Association of South Africa 
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supported by Lawyers for Human Rights contested the action in the courts. Court docu-
ments show that despite being labelled a crime-fighting initiative, Operation Hardstick 
was selectively enforced, affecting only migrant entrepreneurs and not South African busi-
nesses in the same locations.63 Police shuttered over 600 businesses, detained owners, con-
fiscated stock, imposed fines for trading without permits, and verbally abused the owners. 
Affected business owners were informed that “foreigners” were not allowed to operate in 
South Africa, that their asylum-seeker and refugee permits did not entitle them to run a 
business, and that they should leave the area. Thirty displaced migrants from Ethiopia were 
forced to flee when the house they had taken refuge in was fire-bombed. 
The Supreme Court noted that police actions “tell a story of the most naked form of 
xenophobic discrimination and of the utter desperation experienced by the victims of that 
discrimination.”64 It also observed that “one is left with the uneasy feeling that the stance 
adopted by the authorities in relation to the licensing of spaza shops and tuck-shops was in 
order to induce foreign nationals who were destitute to leave our shores.”65 The court ruled 
in favour of the Somali Association and effectively established the right to self-employment 
for all asylum-seekers and refugees. Opposing the appeal were all three tiers of govern-
ment – national, provincial and municipal – including the Limpopo Member of the Execu-
tive Council for Safety, Security and Liaison, the Provincial Commissioner of Police, the 
National Police Commissioner, the Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs, the Ministers 
of Police, Labour and Home Affairs, and two municipalities. 
At city level, there is a preoccupation with the most visible element of the informal sec-
tor – street vendors – who operate in public spaces over which there are often competing 
interests. Policy statements on street trading or the informal sector show that, on paper, the 
positive contribution of the informal sector is sometimes recognised. In its street trading 
policy, the City of Johannesburg, for example, states that “informal trading is a positive 
development in the micro business sector as it contributes to the creation of jobs and alle-
viation of poverty and has the potential to expand further the City’s economic base.”66 The 
City of Cape Town’s policy advocates a “thriving informal trading sector that is valued and 
integrated into the economic life, urban landscape and social activities.”67 The eThekwini 
Informal Economy policy asserts that the “informal economy makes an important contri-
bution to the economic and social life of Durban.”68 Despite the positive rhetoric, city-level 
actions reveal an ambivalent, if not actively hostile, approach to street traders.69 In Johan-
nesburg, this culminated in a draconian action in 2013 when the City Council ordered the 
rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy
20
removal of about 6,000 inner-city street traders, many of them migrants and refugees, in 
Operation Clean Sweep.70 A group of traders took the City to court and the Constitutional 
Court ruled in their favour. Acting Chief Justice Moseneke stated that Operation Clean 
Sweep was an act of “humiliation and degradation” and that the City’s attitude “may well 
border on the cynical.”71 Traders returned to the streets but in more limited numbers with 
the City declaring large inner city areas restricted and prohibited trade zones.
A recent analysis of Cape Town’s approach to street traders shows systematic restriction 
and exclusion from the inner-city.72 Township trading is also characterized by long-term 
neglect. In Khayelitsha, the city council had invested very little in infrastructure for street 
traders and had devolved the management of street trading to a small group of traders, 
with negative consequences for many others.73 Although the policy environment in Cape 
Town varies across the city and between segments of the informal economy, “the modern-
ist vision of a ‘world-class city’ with its associated antipathy to informality dominates, and 
informal space and activity is pathologized.”74 Migrants and refugees face additional chal-
lenges. In an interview for this study, the Cape Town Department of Economic Develop-
ment claimed that “the City, in terms of its policy around trading, doesn’t differentiate and 
we don’t discriminate. There’s set criteria in terms of who qualifies (for a trading bay and 
permit) and how that person qualifies. We don’t look at what nationality the person is.” But, 
as the interviewed official admitted, the City is forced to discriminate in practice because 
refugees have to produce documentation that South Africans do not. As indicated earlier, 
the renewal process for asylum and refugee permits is extremely unpredictable in terms 
of wait times and length granted. One way around this challenge is for South Africans to 
obtain the permit and then rent the space to refugees at a profit.
The regulation of Somali refugee spaza shops in Cape Town has involved various formal 
regulatory attempts to control and curtail the operations of Somali businesses including 
fines, drafting new by-laws, issuing policy statements about foreign shops, and proposing 
laws to tighten the regulation of the spaza market.75 Both formal and informal measures 
skirt the law, are applied in a discriminatory manner, and stifle free competition. Mediation 
efforts led by the police and non-governmental organizations have culminated in agree-
ments prohibiting the opening of new Somali shops in certain areas. The City certainly 
appears to be protecting the interests of South African spaza shop owners over their foreign 
counterparts. 
migration policy series no. 79
21
Durban was once hailed for its relatively liberal stance on the informal sector.76 A pro-
gressive informal-sector policy was unanimously accepted by the City Council in 2001 and 
remains official policy. The Council’s actions reflect a more ambivalent approach, however. 
For example, a council-approved shopping mall development at the inner-city Warwick 
Junction transport node threatened 6,000 traders operating there and was only halted by 
a legal challenge.77 In 2013, traders in both the inner city and outlying areas identified 
harassment by the police as their key business challenge.78 In 2015, traders won a legal case 
challenging the constitutionality of confiscating their goods, forcing the City to redraft the 
street-trader by-laws. Again, court action proved to be the only way to secure relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Distinct from many other refugee-receiving countries, South Africa’s rights-based refugee 
legislation has historically allowed for refugees and asylum-seekers to access a broad array 
of rights, from health services to education and employment. South Africa has never hosted 
a dedicated refugee camp or detention centre. In this environment, refugees and asylum-
seekers have independently found their way into South Africa’s social and economic fab-
ric, sending their children to South African schools, finding employment in South African 
businesses and households, and establishing their own formal and informal businesses. The 
2016 Amendment Act and 2017 White Paper are clear evidence of a new and less generous 
policy direction which is intended to shrink asylum space and further constrain the rights 
and protections afforded to refugees and asylum-seekers. The White Paper at least acknowl-
edges that the existing policy framework unnecessarily criminalizes migrants from other 
SADC countries and does propose a set of quota-driven work and trading permits for these 
migrants, based on recommendations from one of the authors. Whether these proposals 
will pass muster in a crippling xenophobic environment remains to be seen.
Cumulatively, however, the changes documented in this paper illustrate a significant 
shift in South Africa’s policy for the local integration of refugee populations. By removing 
the right to work and confining asylum-seekers to detention centres, it is assumed that 
the flow of asylum-seekers to the country will dry up. This, of course, ignores the growing 
evidence of the positive economic contribution of refugees and asylum-seekers who, under 
existing law, are permitted to pursue economic livelihoods. Denial of the existing right of 
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refugees to seek permanent residence after five years in refugee status is further evidence 
of the desire to ensure that no refugee remains and is integrated into South African society. 
International trends which increasingly stress the positive development impacts of refu-
gee populations are being completely ignored.79 Rather, the emphasis is on the “exceptional-
ism” of forced migrants and the need to craft a coercive, non-developmental approach to 
dealing with refugees. This represents a profound shift in the country’s approach to refugee 
rights, protections, and associated international obligations; moving away from an integra-
tion approach towards a containment approach. While the new approach may appear to 
be a local response to intemperate local demands, it is part of a more global state-led trend 
that seeks to inhibit access to the physical territory and refugee protection systems of those 
countries through erecting physical, economic and social barriers to entry.80 While there 
may be a belief that detention centres will reduce the flow of genuine asylum-seekers to 
South Africa, there remains a whole set of unanswered questions about whether there will 
be new policies that directly affect those who have refugee status. There is no indication 
whether those with refugee status will be denied the right to work, to self-employment, to 
freedom of movement, and to access health and educational services. Yet, they will not be 
given any additional resources and will be expected to pursue their own livelihoods, as at 
present. 
To understand the challenges and obstacles that refugees face in securing these liveli-
hoods, it is important to examine the policy and regulatory environment within which 
those in the informal sector try to survive. Refugees and asylum-seekers confront a for-
midable set of challenges in operating their informal enterprises in South African cities.81 
At best grudgingly tolerated, and at worst increasingly hounded out of communities by 
xenophobic mobs and violent entrepreneurship, those fleeing violence and persecution at 
home certainly do not find a safe haven in South Africa. It is arguable that one of the rea-
sons why the state, and the police in particular, have failed to act against the perpetrators of 
xenophobic violence, with very low rates of arrest and prosecution, is that xenophobia does 
serve very practical ends. Not only does it make many South African communities spaces 
of fear for refugees and asylum-seekers, it also renders the country as a whole an undesir-
able destination for future refugees. As this report argues, xenophobic violence and police 
inaction are undoubtedly not the only difficulties that refugees face in the informal sector. 
South African city managers oscillate between benign neglect and active destruction of this 
vibrant and economically productive sector. Migrants who run informal enterprises have 
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been major targets of a series of national, provincial and local-level “operations” designed 
to limit or eradicate their businesses from urban space. There is thus a fundamental contra-
diction between a refugee protection policy that demands self-reliance from refugees and 
informal sector policies that undermine self-reliance at every turn. 
Restricting opportunities to pursue a livelihood in the country’s informal sector also 
contributes to the general aim of making South Africa undesirable. A comparison of the 
draft and final Refugees Amendment Act suggests that the petitions and representations 
of human rights groups and refugee and migrant associations have had little or no impact 
in softening the legislation. Litigation in the courts is therefore likely to continue to be the 
most likely way to roll back draconian provisions. The courts have played an increasingly 
important role in securing the livelihoods of informal-sector operators in general, and 
migrant entrepreneurs in particular, in post-apartheid South Africa. Litigation has been 
one of the key sources of support to migrant entrepreneurs, highlighting the core contra-
diction between the rights enshrined in the South African Constitution, on the one hand, 
and the policies and actions of key government departments and officials, on the other. 
Protecting refugee rights is likely to continue to rely on a cohort of non-governmental orga-
nizations prioritizing migrant livelihood rights and being willing and able to pursue time-
consuming and costly litigation on their behalf. 
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To understand the policy environment within which refugees establish and operate 
their enterprises in South Africa’s informal sector, this report brings together two 
streams of policy analysis. The first concerns the changing refugee policies and the 
erosion of the progressive approach that characterized the immediate post-apartheid 
period. The second concerns the informal sector policy, which oscillates between 
tolerance and attempted destruction at national and municipal levels. While there 
have been longstanding tensions between foreign and South African informal 
sector operators, an overtly anti-foreign migrant sentiment has increasingly been 
expressed in official policy and practice. This report describes the strategies being 
used to turn South Africa into an undesirable destination for refugees, including 
the setting up of additional procedural, administrative and logistical hurdles; the 
undercutting of court judgments affirming the right of asylum-seekers and refugees 
to employment and self-employment; ensuring that protection is always temporary 
by making it extremely difficult for refugees to progress to permanent residence 
and eventual citizenship; and restricting opportunities to pursue a livelihood in the 
informal sector. The authors conclude that the protection of refugee rights is likely 
to continue to depend on a cohort of non-governmental organizations prioritizing 
migrant livelihood rights and being willing and able to pursue time-consuming and 
costly litigation on their behalf. 
